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be sufficient, or should the court consider the possibility of maladjustment
to both the person seeking to adopt and the child, resulting from diametrically opposed personalities? Would the granting of the adoption
petition deprive the parent and the children of the natural and normal
feelings that should exist between every parent and child? These are all
questions that every court should consider prior to making a decision, and
each case that comes before the court will present a different factual situation and could conceivably result in a different decision.
Until the Wyoming Statutes dealing with this subject are strictly
construed the answer to these questions will remain in doubt. Two of the
statutes 17 clearly state that the consent of the parent is an essential part
of the adoption proceeding, but another' 8 does indicate a manner in which
the adoption proceeding could be carried out without the consent of the
natural parent.
JAMES F. SLOSS

WIRE TAPPING As A DEPRIVATION OF PRIVACY OF COUNSEL

In a prosecution of a government employee for copying, taking, concealing and removing documents filed with the Justice Department relating to espionage activities and the national defense, the defendant
charged that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents intercepted telephone
conversations between her and her counsel, both before and during her
trial in the District of Columbia, and that she was therefore denied the
effective assistance of counsel. From the denial of a motion for a new
trial made upon this ground defendant appealed. Held: the trial court
erred in holding that the interception of telephone messages between the
defendant and her counsel before and during her trial, if it occurred,
was nothing more than a serious breach of ethics, since if the interception
taak place the defendant's right to effective aid of counsel was violated
and the verdict would have to be set aside. Coplon v. United States, 191
F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
The question involved in the Coplon case is the right to private
consultation with counsel both before trial and during the trial, regardless
of whether such interceptions of telephone conversations between the
accused and her counsel operated as a means of procuring evidence used
to convict. It is well established that an accused does not enjoy the effective aid of counsel if he is denied the right of private consultation with
17.
18.

See Notes 9 and 10, supra.
See Note 12, supra.

RECENT CASES

him, 1 but this appears to be the first time the question has arisen in federal
prosecutions as a result of wire-tapping.
The Fifth Amendment of the federal constitution provides that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law. Such due process includes the right of one accused of crime to
have the effective and substantial aid of counsel. 2 Moreover, under the
Sixth Amendment, the federal courts have no jurisdiction or power to
render judgment and sentence against accused unless he has, or waives the
assistance of, counsel, and judgment of conviction thus pronounced without
jurisdiction is void. 3 In some'State jurisdictions this right to counsel is
limited to capital cases 4 and to non-capital cases where the lack of represen5
The right
tation would result in particular unfairness to the accused.
6
to have the assistance of counsel means effective assistance and cannot
7
be satisfied by a mere formal appointment.
It was not until 1836 that the English criminal system by act of Parliament conferred the full right to have aid of counsel in respect to felonies
generally. 8 Prior to that, only parties in civil cases and persons accused
of misdemeanors were entitled to the full assistance of counsel.9 Lord
Coke defended the early rule on the grounds that in felonies the court itself
was counsel for the prisoner. But obviously a judge cannot investigate
the facts, advise and direct the defense, or participate in those necessary
conferences between counsel and accused which sometimes partake of the
inviolable character of the confessional. However, he can and should see
to it that in the proceedings before the court the accused shall be dealt
with justly and fairly.10 It appears that this early English rule was rejected in at least twelve of the thirteen colonies, and the right to counsel
fully recognized in all criminal prosecutions, save that in one or two
instances that right was limited to capital offenses or to the more serious
crimes. 11
The right to "effective and substantial assistance" of counsel as secured
by the Sixth Amendment is recognized as essential to any fair trial of a
case against a prisoner. To hold otherwise would be in effect to deny
those fundamental rights of life and liberty guaranteed by the Constitution
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

14 Am. Jur., Criminal Law (1938), 885 Sec. 171; In State ei rel. Tucker v. Davis,
9 Okla. Crim. Rep. 94, 130 Pac. 962, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1083 (1913); In Ex Parte
Rider, 50 Cal. App. 797, 195 Pac. 965 (1920); People ex rel. Burgess v. Riseley, 13
Abb N.C. 186, 1 N.Y. Crim. Rep. 492 (1883); Ex parte Snyder, 62 Cal. App. 697,
217 Pac. 777 (1923).
Neufield v. United States, 73 App. D.C. 174, 182, 118 F.2d 375, 383 (1941).
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938).
McDonald v. Com., 175 Mass. 322, 55 N.E. 874, 75 Am. St. Rep. 295, affirmed in
180 U.S. 311, 45 L. Ed. 542, 21 S. Ct. 589 (1901).
Betts v. Brady, 516 U.S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595 (1942).
Thomas v. District of Columbia, 90 F.2d 424, 67 App. D.C. 179 (1957); McDonald
V. Hudspeth, 41 F. Supp. 182 (1957).
U.S. ex rel. Mitchell v. Thompson, 56 F. Supp. 683 (1946).
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60, 53 S. Ct. 55, 61, 84 A.L.R. 27, 555 (1952).
Ibid.
Id. at 287 U.S. 61, 53 S. Ct. 61, 84 A.L.R. 556.
Ibid.
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in the Fifth Amendment. 12 This right is unqualifiedly guarded by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments without making the vindication of the
13
right depend upon whether its denial resulted in demonstrable prejudice. '
It is true the prompt disposition of criminal cases is to be commended and
encouraged. But in reaching that result a defendant, charged with a
serious crime, must not be stripped of the right of private consultation
in preparing his defense. It is not due process of law, regardless of the
merits of the case if the constitutional rights of the accused are not scrupulously observed. 14 In United States v. Venuto, the court said, "We can
find no justification for imposing a restriction of silence between accused
and counsel during a trial recess. We reject the Government contention
that defendant and his counsel must prove affirmatively the exact prejudice
produced by this injunction in a federal prosecution. Not only would
this require them to disclose what would have been privileged communication between attorney and client, but, as stated in Glasser v. United States,
supra, 315 U.S. 60 at page 76, 62 S. Ct. 457 at page 467, 86 L. Ed. 680:
'The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and
absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice caluclations as to the amount of
prejudice arising from its denial.' "15
The Glasser case also related that, "Upon the trial judge rests the duty
of seeing that the trial is conducted with solicitude for the essential rights
of the accused." 16
As to just when and where consultations between prisoners and their
attorneys may be had will vary with the circumstances of each case, within
the discretion of the officer having the custody of such prisoner; but this
discretion is subject to the review of the courts, and it must not be arbitarily
used. 17 The attorney should not be compelled to give the officer the
reason for a private interview, if he is to grant it, because to adopt such
a rule would be to substitute the judgment of the officer, upon questions
involving the prisoner's defense, in place of the judgment of the prisoner
and his counsel.1 8 No attorney should be compelled to disclose to any
person any fact which would directly or indirectly affect the defense of
his client. 19 In some jurisdictions a wilful denial of the right by the sheriff,
warden or other officer, constitutes a criminal offense. 20 The judge, therefore, should not be able to permit such violations of the right to assistance
of counsel on the grounds of no prejudice to the accused, since he would
be subject to punishment if he were the jailor in such a case and not the
12.
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U.S. Const. Amend. V: "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of the law."
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76, 62 S.Ct. 457, 467, 86 L. Ed. 680, 702 (1942).
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527 (1932).
182 F.2d at 522 (1950).
315 U.S. at 71, 62 S.Ct. at 465, 86 L. Ed. at 699 (1942).
23 A.L.R. 1384 (1923).
Ex Parte Snyder, 62 Cal. App. 697, 699, 217 Pac. 777, 779, 54 A.L.R. 1226 (1923).
Ibid.
23 A.L.R. 1382 (1923) and 54 A.L.R. 1225 (1928).

RECENT CASES

judge. The right to be heard by counsel would, in the language of Saint
Paul, I Cor. 13, 1, "become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal," if
it did not include the right to a full and confidential consultation with such
counsel, with no other persons present to hear what was said. This is a
21
material right, essential to justice.
The Federal Constitutional provisions guaranteeing the assistance of
22
counsel are duplicated in most State Constitutions including Wyoming.
In some jurisdictions, the Constitutions are often supplemented by statutes
expressly concerned with this right of consultation. 23 Wyoming has a
statute providing for the assignment of counsel for indigent prisoners which
guarantees free access to the accused by his counsel at all reasonable
hours. 24 But it appears there are no Wyoming decisions on the right to
private consultation, and very few decisions relating to the assistance of
counsel. The court in James v. State,25 recognized the importance of the
right to advice of counsel, as guaranteed by section 10, article 1 of our
Constitution, and the statute noted above.
In light of the cases considered there can be little doubt of the soundness of the Coplon decision, and its adoption by the Wyoming courts. To
hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, "that there
are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea
26
of free government which no member of the Union may disregard."
ROBERT
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